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RECENT CASES
toward Star Chamber'7 proceedings, review on appeal should render unlikely
such an eventuality.
LYLE E. BALL
TORTS - WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE - SURVIVAL OF CAUSE OF ACTION
UPON DEATH OF BENEFICIARY - Action was brought by the Administrator
of the estate of Julia Dianiska who was killed by the defendant's train. Prior
to the trial the decedent's only living next of kin who sustained pecuniary
damages died. On appeal the court held, that as there remained no living
beneficiary who suffered pecuniary injury as a result of the death of Julia
Dianiska and as the cause of action is not such species of property as will
pass to the heirs or next of kin of those to whom the right is given,' the
action could not be maintained. Danis v. New York Central Ry., 160 Ohio St.
474, 117 N.E.2d. 39 (1954).
At common law no action lay for the death of a human being caused by
negligent or wrongful act of another,2 regardless of the relationship between
the deceased and the beneficiary and of the financial loss occasioned by the
death.3 This rule was originally supported by the doctrine that when death
resulted, the civil remedy was merged in 'the public offense. 4 It was said to
be inconsistent with the policy of law to permit the value of human life to
become the subject of litigation.5 Lord Ellenborough's opinion in the case of
Baker v. Bolton,6 seems to be the primary authority supporting the rule.
In reference to the case Prosser says, "Lord Ellenborough, whose forte was
never common sense, held without citing any authority and declaring in
broad terms that, 'in a Civil Court the death of a human being could not
be complained of as an injury.' "7 The holding, which was criticized in both
Englands and the United States,9 was nullified in England by passage of the
Fatal Accidents Act of 1846,10 better known as Lord Campbell's Act. Today,
every American state has a remedy for wrongful death, most of which were
modeled after Lord Campbell's Act."
17. Smith & Zurcher, Dictionary of American Politics (1944) p. 291 "A secret pro-
ceeding in which a person whose interests are affected is given inadequate or no oppor-
tunity to present his case, and in which the proceedings are conducted and conclusions
reached in derogation of usual forms. The name is derived from the Star Chamber, an
ancient court abolished by Parliament in 1641 which had no jury and was permitted to
apply torture."
1. Ohio Rev. Code §2125.02 provides: "that the action shall be brought in the :lame
of the personal representative of the decedent for the exclusive benefit of the surviving
spouse, the children, and other surviving *next to kin of the decedent who have suffered
pecuniary injury as a result of such death.-
2. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Moses, 287 U. S. 530, 539 (1932); Kelliher v. New
York Central & Hudson River Ry., 212 N. Y, 207, 105 N.E. 824 (1914).
3. Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U. S. 754 (1877); Tullgren v. Amoskeag Mfg.
Co., 82 N. H. 268, 133 At. 4 (1926) (husband and wife).
4. See Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. McElwain, 98 Ky. 700, 34 S.W. 236, 237 (1896).
5. See Phillip v. Northern Pacific Ky., 46 Wash. 173, 89 Pac. 468, 470 (1907).
6. 1 Camp 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033, (1808).
7. Prosser, Torts 955 (1941).
8. See Osborne v. Gillett, L. R. 8, Exch. 88 (1873) passim; Clark v. London Gen-
eral Omnibus Co., 2 K.B. 648 (1906) passim.
9. See West v. Boston & Maine Ry., 81 N. H. 522, 129 Atl. 768, 770 (1925); Rowe
v. Richards, 35 S. D. 201, 151 N. W. 1001, 1003 (1915).
10. 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
11. Prosser, Torts 955 (1941).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
The rule laid down in the instant case is quite widely followed" but in
some states is qualified so as to apply only if the action has not been com-
menced prior to the death of the beneficiary.':! However, what seems to be the
more modem and probably the prevailing view is that the cause of action
vests in the beneficiary immediately after the wrongful death, thereafter
becoming his property and a part of his estate.14 The courts allowing the
right of action to survive do so mainly on the ground, "that the damages award-
ed for the negligent act are such as result to the property rights of the person
or persons for whose benefit the cause of action was created. 1 3 Many of
the jurisdictions adhering to this rule limit the damages which the repre-
sentative of the deceased beneficiary may collect to the actual monetary loss
suffered by the beneficiary during his life. 1
The decision of the instant case was based upon a case decided forty-four
years previously." The court recognized that the holding was not in accord
with the more modem rule, but stated that if the legislature desired a differ-
ent result, sufficient time had elapsed for statutory effectuation of this desire.
North Dakota has not had to deal with this problem, but has decided one
related case in which the tortfeasor died before the action was commenced.1
8
The court reasoned that the statute19 providing that the "action" should not
abate on the death of either party to the record should be strictly construed
as in derogation of the common law, distinguishing it from death statutes
which provide that the "cause of action" might survive the death of either
party. Hence they held that the statute did not apply when no action had been
begun before the death of the tortfeasor. The decision is in accord with
most of the courts having dealt with similar death statutes.2 0
In view of the strict construction given the wrongful death statute by the
North Dakota Court, it seems quite probable that it would have followed the
12. E.g., Billingsley v. St. Louis Iron Mountain & Southern Ry., 84 Ark. 617, 107 S.
W. 173 (1907); Huberwald v. Orleans Ry., 50 La. 477, 23 So. 474 (1898); State v.
Baltimore & Ohio Ry., 70 Md. 319, 17 At. 88 (1889) .(Here the statute required the
action to be brought in the name of the state for the use of the beneficiary, but the
court said this made no difference.); Bean v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 94 Tenn. 388, 29
S.W. 370 (1895) (Strict construction given the death statute as next of kin surviving the
beneficiary were being awarded something which never existed at common law); Schmidt
v. Menosha Woodenware Co., 99 Wis. 300, 74 N.W. 797 (1898); See Wabash By. v.
Gretzinger, 182 Ind. 155, 104 N.E. 69, 75 (1914).
13. E.g., Frazier v. Georgia Ry. & Banking Co., 101 Ga. 77, 28 S.E. 662 (1897);
Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 Il1. 571, 162 N.E. 170 (1928); Gilkeson v. Missouri Pac. By.,
222 Mo. 173, 121 S.W. 138 (1909).
14. E.g., Union Steamboat Co. v. Chafflin's Adm'rs., 204 Fed. 412 (7th Cir. 1913);
Waldo v. Goodsell, 33 Conn. 432 (1866); White v. A. T. & S. F. By., 125 Kan. 537, 265
Pac. 73 (1928); Johnston v. Bay Street By., 222 Mass. 583, 111 N.E. 391 (1916); Meekin
v. Brooklyn Heights By., 164 N. Y. 145, 58 N.E. 50 (1900); Neil v. Wilson, 146 N. C.
242, 59 S.E. 674 (1907); Walsh v. Bressette, 51 R. I. 354, 155 Atl. /1 (1931); See
Kentucky Utilities Co. v. McCarty's Adm'rs., 169 Ky. 38, 183 S.W. 2,37, 241 (1916);
City of Shawnee v. Cheek, 41 Okla. 227, 137 Pac. 724, 733 (191,3); Fitzgerald v.
Edison Electric Illuminating Co., 207 Penn. 118, 56 Atl. 350, 351 (1903).
15. Meekin v. Brooklyn Heights By., supra nhote 14 at 53.
16. E.g., Van Beeck Adm'r. v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U. S. 342 (1936); Cooper v.
Shore Electric Co., 63 N. J. L. 558, 44 Atl. 633 (1899); Sider v. General Eelectric Co.,
238 N. Y. 64, 143 N.E. 792 (1924); See Dotsie v. Lewiston Crushed Stone Co., 136
Me. 284, 8 A.2d 393, 397 (1939).
17. Doyle v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry., 81 Ohio St. 184, 90 N.E. 165 (1909) (The court
held the cause of action for the sole beneficiary is not such species of property as will,
under the provisions of the statute, pass to the heirs or next of kin of the sole bene-
ficiary).
18. Willard v. Mohn, 24 N. D. 390, 139 N.W. 979 (1913).
19. N. D. Rev. Code §7690 (1905); N. D. Rev. Code §32-2105 (1943).
20. Prosser, Torts 959 (1941).
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decision of the principle case. However, recent legislation2l may prompt
North Dakota to adopt the more reasonable and modem view that the
cause of action is a property right vesting in the beneficiary immediately after
the decedent's wrongful death.
FRED E. WHISENAND JR.
21. N. D. Rev. Code §28-01261 (Supp. 1953) provides: "No action or cause of
action, except for breach of promise, alienation of affections, libel and slander, shall abate
by the death of a parry or of a person who might have been a party had such death
Aot occurred."
